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This study investigates the relationship between corporate R&D and 
creditor value. The empirical results suggest that such relationship is 
contingent on the situations of existing R&D investment and institution-
al arrangement of corporate governance. We find that R&D investment 
increases creditor value when insufficient R&D threatens survival, while 
reduces creditor value when such threat is mitigated. Moreover, such 
curvilinear relationship is mainly driven by firms with relatively weak 
managerial entrenchment. Hypotheses are tested with 98 U.S. listed firms 
in manufacturing sector over 2001-2007. 
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1. Introduction
How corporate innovation creates value for in-vestors has long been discussed among econo-mists and management scholars. However, the 
emphasis of the research is mostly on shareholder value, 
i.e. stock market returns (e.g. [1,2]). And less is understood 
about how innovation affects creditor value. In spite of a 
few empirical studies debating on R&D and creditor val-
ue (e.g. [3,4]), different predictions and results imply that 
certain nuances in the relationship, such as situational and 
institutional factors, are underexplored. In this study, we 
focus on how the effect of growing R&D investment on 
creditor value varies across firms with different levels of 
existing R&D investment and managerial entrenchment. 
Creditors are critical because debt accounts for over 
90 percent of all new external financing [5]. Some recent 
evidence shows that the importance of debt persists and 
even increases over time. According to statistics of the Se-
curities Industry and Financial Markets Association, total 
value of issued corporate debt in the U.S. is about $14.4 
trillion during 2000-2014, while total value of equity is 
only about $3.4 trillion. The considerable size and influ-
ence of corporate debt financing call for more attention on 
corporate creditors.
This study contributes to literature by exploring the 
nuanced effect of R&D on creditor value. Shi (2003) doc-
uments that for creditors R&D risks dominate the benefits, 
while Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique (2008) find that 
R&D intensity increases creditor value. We show that 
the effect of R&D on creditors may not be monotonic. 
Although R&D as well as other innovative activities are 
generally not favorable to creditors [4,6], creditors have 
different attitudes towards R&D in different situations. 
9Journal of Business Administration Research | Volume 02 | Issue 04 | October 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0 DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i4.1099
When lack of R&D threatens survival of the firm, addi-
tional R&D investment mitigates such threat, reduces firm 
default risk, and increases creditor value. However, when 
R&D investment is beyond certain level and the problem 
of insufficient R&D is mitigated, additional R&D invest-
ment imposes extra risks on creditors without extra bene-
fits, and thus impairs creditor value. 
In addition, this study highlights the contingent role of 
corporate governance in creditor value creation and pro-
tection. Managers are empowered and entrenched when 
the governance provisions are beneficial to them rather 
than shareholders. Although managerial entrenchment im-
pairs shareholder value due to less risk-taking than the op-
timal level [7,8], it affects creditor value in a more nuanced 
way. Given the varying attitude of creditor vis-à-vis R&D, 
how the managerial entrenchment affects creditor value 
depends on the situation of existing R&D investment, or 
more specifically, whether creditors are currently con-
cerned about the scarcity of R&D that threatens survival, 
or the excess of R&D that brings more risks than returns 
to them.
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Devel-
opment
2.1 Credit Market and Creditors
Credit market is a critical source of financing and serves 
as a marketplace where firms are evaluated based on abil-
ity and willingness to repay the debt obligations. Different 
from that in stock market, firm value in credit market is 
not decided by the excess return but by the safety of cred-
itors’ investments, due to the special position of creditors 
in terms of exposure to risk and return [9-12]). Creditor val-
ue declines if the firm becomes riskier, and vice versa. 
Credit risk is generally measured by credit rating and 
yield spread. Credit ratings are assigned by rating agen-
cies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Rat-
ings, to represent rating agencies’ assessment of a firm’s 
creditworthiness. The poorer the credit rating, the heavier 
discount of firm value by creditors due to higher risks. 
Yield spread as another commonly used instrument, mea-
sures firm credit risk more directly. It represents additional 
yield or “spread” of corporate bond over the yield of gov-
ernment bond, and shows the incremental probability that 
a firm will not be able to meet its debt obligations. Gov-
ernment bond, particularly the U.S. Treasury bond serving 
as benchmark in calculating yield spread, is regarded as 
risk-free and will never default [13-16]). The wider the yield 
spread, the heavier discount of firm value by creditors due 
to higher risks.
2.2 Creditors and Innovation
Creditors are different from shareholders and managers 
vis-à-vis risk-taking. As has been discussed since the 
seminal work of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers 
(1977), shareholders have strong incentives to invest in 
risky projects as they are able to win the upside benefits 
from risk-taking with limited losses. They can further re-
duce their risk of loss by keeping diversified investment 
portfolios [17]. On the contrary, creditors seek to minimize 
firm risks as they do not share any of the benefits above 
their promised principal and interests in the contract. On 
top of that, creditors also have to bear the downside cost 
of increased default risk. And managers, whose employ-
ment and income are tied to one firm, cannot diversify 
their risks, and therefore are risk-averse in decisions [18-20]. 
Creditors bear the downside risk and shareholders en-
joy the upside potential when firms invest in risk projects, 
creditors are expected to have a negative attitude towards 
risky investment such as R&D. R&D is characterized as 
risky due to its long investment horizon, large variance 
of outcomes, and high probability of failure [21,22]). While 
R&D increases returns, it also increases the risks of the 
firm, and the concern of the increasing risks dominates 
the creditors’ perception of firm value, because their pay-
out is predetermined in the debt contract and they cannot 
share the high returns (Shi, 2003). Although Acharya and 
Subramanian (2009) and Seifert and Gonenc (2012) do 
not test how creditors evaluate R&D directly, they find 
that creditors try to influence management to suppress 
R&D and other innovative activities as long as they have 
such ability. Moreover, R&D investment generates highly 
intangible and specialized resources that cannot serve as 
favorable collateral for creditors, as they are difficult to 
value if not readily redeployed [23-26].
A more recent study, however, suggest that R&D 
actually contributes to higher creditor value. Eberhart, 
Maxwell, and Siddique (2008) replicate Shi’s (2003) work 
with alternative measures of R&D intensity, and find that 
firms with more R&D intensity have better bond rating 
and lower required spreads, which implies that R&D cre-
ates value for bondholders as it does for shareholders. In 
this paper, Eberhart, et al. (2008) focus on five traditional 
R&D-intensive industries, and argue that the original 
measure of R&D intensity in Shi (2003)—R&D to market 
capitalization—gives misleading impression of R&D dy-
namics because stock market generally reacts positively to 
an R&D increase. They suggest that the ratio of R&D to 
sales or R&D to assets are better measures of R&D inten-
sity. In addition, Eberhart, et al. (2008) find that the posi-
tive effect of R&D is larger when the initial default risk of 
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the firms is higher.
The lack of sufficient R&D is long been regarded as 
one source of business failure, which results in high de-
fault risk. Through intensive studies on global business 
history across 15 industries since the 1960s, Franko (1989) 
finds that insufficient R&D and neglect of technological 
innovation are the determining factors that explain why 
many U.S. and U.K. firms lost their market shares and 
competitiveness to their Asian and European counterparts. 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990) also documents that succes-
sive R&D investments contribute to a firm’s absorptive 
capacity and facilitate knowledge accumulation. The 
path-dependence nature of absorptive capacity and knowl-
edge accumulation makes ceasing investment extremely 
costly. Because exploitation of new knowledge is based 
on the understanding of prior one, a firm may fail to rec-
ognize the significance of new technological opportunities 
in subsequent periods without early-stage investments in 
the knowledge of the field. Therefore, insufficient invest-
ment in R&D hampers a firm’s survival and increases de-
fault risk, and reduces the possibility that creditors receive 
payments specified in the debt contract.
We propose that that the relationship between R&D 
investment and creditor value is non-monotonic. Either 
too little or too much R&D investment is associated with 
low creditor value. On the one hand, when the survival of 
firm is threatened by the lack of R&D, even lower R&D 
investment leads to shrinking market shares and obsolete 
production and management techniques. This increases 
risk of bankruptcy and default, and impairs creditor value. 
On the other hand, when the problem of insufficient R&D 
is mitigated, R&D investment becomes the instrument to 
capture technological opportunities and market returns. 
Since creditors cannot share the high returns brought by 
high R&D (Eberhart, Maxwell, and Siddique, 2008; Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977; Smith and Warner, 
1979), increasing R&D investment impairs creditor value 
in this situation.
Hypothesis 1: R&D investment first increases creditor 
value, and reduces creditor value after R&D investment 
surpasses a threshold. 
2.3 Managerial Entrenchment, Creditors, and In-
novation
Although shareholders are owners of firms and have 
rights to discipline management, their abilities to do so 
differ across firms. Institutional arrangements of corpo-
rate governance, in terms of corporate charter and bylaw 
provisions, affect relations between shareholders and the 
management. In some cases, the provisions such increase 
costs of shareholders challenging the management, re-
strict shareholder participation, and shift the power of 
shareholders to the management [27]. The increased power 
of management over shareholders leads to entrenchment 
and entrenched managers are more likely to pursue their 
private interests (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009), to 
engage in shirking and empire building, to have higher 
compensation, and to invest in projects with lower risks 
than the optimal level for shareholders [28-30]. With regard 
to corporate R&D, Meulbroek, Mitchell, Mulherin, Net-
ter, and Poulsen (1990) [31] find that the passage of antita-
keover provisions, which entrench managers but restrict 
shareholders, leads to decrease of R&D intensity. O’Con-
nor and Matthew Rafferty (2012) [32] argue that although it 
is hard to establish the causality between entrenched ex-
ecutives and R&D expenditures, firms that invest little in 
R&D are more likely to have governance provisions that 
entrench executives.
When the existing R&D investment is insufficient, the 
scarce investment in R&D is regarded as problematic and 
risky by creditors as it threatens survival and reduces the 
probability that a firm would meet its debt obligations. 
Then creditors benefit if R&D investment increases in this 
situation. However, the presence of strong managerial en-
trenchment reduces such expected benefits, since strongly 
entrenched managers are capable to minimize their risks 
and to suppress R&D investment easily. On the other 
hand, when existing R&D investment is highly intensive, 
further increasing R&D investment is regarded as risky by 
creditors as they cannot enjoy the excess returns brought 
by innovation. Then the presence of strong managerial en-
trenchment increases creditor value, because strongly en-
trenched managers are enabled to restrict R&D investment 
in a foreseeable future, which also reduces the distress of 
creditors caused by the enlarged mismatch between risks 
and returns associated with even more R&D investment. 
Hypothesis 2: The curvilinear relationship between 
R&D investment and creditor value is more salient to 
firms with weak managerial entrenchment.
3. Data and Methods
We collect data from different sources. Data of corporate 
bonds is from the Fixed Investment Securities Database 
(FISD) and the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine 
(TRACE). We obtain quarterly firms-level financial infor-
mation and credit ratings from COMPUSTAT and CRSP, 
to match the bond characteristics in FISD and TRACE 
which are also quarterly based. Managerial entrenchment 
data is compiled by Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). 
We also collect industrial tax credit data from Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS), which serves as the potential 
instrumental variable to examine the endogeneity of 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i4.1099
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independent variables. Our sample only includes firms 
in manufacturing sector in the U.S. (4-digit SIC codes 
2000-3999). We also exclude bonds that are convertible, 
putable, callable, asset backed, are not issued in U.S. 
dollars, not domiciled in the U.S., not senior unsecured 
obligations of the issuing firm, that have floating cou-
pons or credit enhancements, or have less than one year 
to maturity, because their yield spreads are not accurate 
representations of creditor value (Dick-Nielsen, 2009 [33]; 
Elkamhi, Pungaliya, and Vijh, 2014). After we clean data 
for missing variables, the final sample includes 98 U.S. 
listed firms and covers the period from the fourth quarter 
of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2007. There are 766 firm-
year-quarter observations in total. Since we measure cred-
itor value at t+1 year-quarter to detect the credit market 
reaction to the increase of R&D investment at t year-quar-
ter, 519 observations are examined.
Models are jointly estimated by seemingly unrelated 
regressions (SUR) based on ordinary least squares (OLS), 
in order to deal with the cross-equation correlation of er-
ror terms, which is raised in Shi (2003) and Eberhart, et 
al. (2008). To correct for the unobserved within-firm cor-
relation, we estimate regressions with clustered standard 
errors by firm. To mitigate the impact of extreme values, 
we winsorize all variables at top and bottom 1% level.   
3.1 Dependent Variables
The first dependent variable is credit rating at t+1 
year-quarter. We adopt S&P domestic long term issuer 
credit rating and concert rating from letter designations to 
numerical grades (AAA = 1, AA+ = 2, AA = 3, ……, D 
= 22). Smaller number indicates better credit rating and 
lower perceived default risks.
The second dependent variable is yield spread at t+1 
year-quarter. We follow Bessembinder, Kahle, Maxwell, 
and Xu (2009) [34] and transform bond yield in the da-
tabase into end-of-day yield. We then choose the first 
end-of-day bond yield available within the 15 days after 
quarterly earnings announcement date. We compute yield 
spread of the bond by subtracting the yield of U.S. Trea-
sury bond with the most similar maturity from the end-of-
day yield. We calculate the weighted average yield spread 
for firms with multiple bonds. Narrower yield spread indi-
cates lower perceived default risks.
3.2 Independent Variables
The main independent variable in this study is R&D in-
tensity at t year-quarter, which is measured as R&D ex-
penses to total assets. The higher value indicates the high-
er proportion of resources that have been used to generate 
potential firm-specific intangible assets in the long run, 
which is hard to be valued (Balakrishnan and Fox, 1993; 
Vincente-Lorente, 2001).
3.3 Control Variables
We also control for several covariates that affect credit 
rating or yield spread. Debt Maturity is the number of 
years to final maturity; Liquidity is measured as current 
assets to current liabilities; SG&A controls for non-pro-
duction costs, which is measures as selling, general and 
administrative expenses to total assets; return on assets 
(ROA) controls for firm profitability , which is measured 
as operating income before depreciation to total assets; 
market-to-book ratio (M/B Ratio) is included to control 
for firm performance in stock market; Leverage is mea-
sured as total liabilities to total assets; Equity Volatility is 
the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns 
of the 254-day period ending one day before the earnings 
announcement date [35-37]; Size is measured by natural log-
arithm of total assets; Finally, we control for industry het-
erogeneity and economic turbulence over time by industry 
and year-quarter dummies.
4. Empirical Results
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the whole sam-
ple. Credit rating and yield spread are closely correlated 
as expected in the literature, but each of them still mea-
sures some different aspects that have not been captured 
by the other. R&D intensity is negatively and significantly 
correlated with credit rating and yield spread, which con-
firm the argument of Eberhart et al. (2008) that increasing 
R&D intensity benefits creditors. There is not severe mul-
ticollinearity among explanatory variables.
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 Credit Ratingit+1
1.00
2
Yield 
Spread-
it+1
0.70* 1.00
3
R&D 
Intensity-
it
-0.60* -0.25* 1.00
4
Debt 
Matu-
rityit
-0.03 0.02 0.04 1.00
5 SG&Ait -0.36* -0.23* 0.42* -0.01 1.00
6 ROAit -0.38* -0.22* 0.25* -0.03 0.49* 1.00
7 M/B Ratioit
-0.21* -0.07 0.20* 0.01 0.27* 0.20* 1.00
8 Lever-ageit
0.30* 0.21* -0.23* 0.03 -0.07 -0.11* 0.09* 1.00
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i4.1099
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Equity 
Volatil-
ityit
0.39* 0.54* -0.01 -0.03 -0.20* -0.23* -0.01 0.14* 1.00
10 Sizeit -0.53* -0.39* 0.20* 0.08* -0.4* -0.09* 0.0821* -0.11* -0.14* 1.00
Mean 6.45 97.34 0.01 7.81 0.12 0.04 3.73 0.63 25.45 9.53
Min 1.00 24.02 0.00 1.08 0.01 0.01 -15.73 0.25 11.76 7.43
Max 16.00 642.45 0.06 29.00 0.45 0.08 21.96 1.04 71.00 11.65
Std. 
Dev.
2.93 87.09 0.01 5.69 0.09 0.02 3.66 0.16 10.63 1.07
Note: Industry and year-quarter dummies not presented; * if p <0.05.
Table 2 shows models that examine the full sample. 
Model 1 and model 3 include only linear term of R&D 
intensity and the control variables, and have credit rating 
and yield spread as proxies of creditor value, respectively. 
The negative and significant coefficients of R&D inten-
sityit in both models suggest that more R&D investment 
leads to better credit rating and narrower yield spread, 
and contributes to more creditor value. This is consistent 
with the findings of Eberhart et al. (2008). As for the re-
sults for control variables, lower leverage and larger size 
are signals of lower credit risk and associated with better 
credit rating. High equity volatility implies the risk-taking 
propensity of the firm, which is negatively associated with 
creditor value. 
Table 2. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: Full Sample
DV: Credit Ratingit+1 DV: Yield Spreadit+1
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
R&D Intensityit -37.825*** -112.469** -1190.195* -7200.937**
(10.984) (43.388) (566.007) (2651.628)
Sq.R&D Inten-
sityit
1261.083* 101549.288**
(601.015) (39408.925)
Debt Maturityit 0.016+ 0.018* 0.387 0.513
(0.009) (0.009) (0.308) (0.323)
SG&Ait -1.137 0.164 -11.003 93.771
(1.766) (1.357) (78.669) (74.030)
ROAit -15.350+ -14.826+ -1007.249 -965.100
(8.821) (8.386) (632.539) (631.100)
M/B Ratioit -0.013 -0.011 -0.214 -0.072
(0.028) (0.022) (1.125) (0.768)
Leverageit 4.904*** 4.318*** 172.797* 125.620+
(1.210) (1.179) (87.963) (70.495)
Equity Volatilityit 0.035* 0.033* 2.602** 2.464***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.816) (0.717)
Sizeit -1.107*** -1.084*** -21.711*** -19.812***
(0.148) (0.132) (4.831) (4.877)
Constant 16.965*** 17.036*** 369.538*** 375.230***
(1.361) (1.208) (63.782) (63.786)
F-Statistics 151.67*** 153.59*** 32.36*** 33.96***
Adj. R-Squared 0.9475 0.9489 0.7896 0.8003
Wooldridge’s 
F-Test of En-
dogeneity
1.03 0.41 0.01 0.06
Observations 519 519 519 519
Note: + if p < 0.10; * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001; p-value 
are calculated for two-tailed test; Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses; industry and year-quarter dummies are included but are not reported 
to preserve space.
Model 2 and model 4 test and support hypothesis 1. 
The negative and significant coefficient of R&D Intensityit 
and the positive and significant coefficient of Sq.R&D In-
tensityit jointly suggest that increasing R&D intensity in-
creases creditor value by mitigating the problem of insuf-
ficient R&D initially, but gradually impairs creditor value 
because it brings more risks then returns to creditors. 
Tables 3 presents effects of R&D intensity on creditor 
value in firms with different levels of managerial en-
Table 3. Seemingly Unrelated Regressions: Subsample Analysis
Weak Managerial Entrenchment
DV: Credit Ratingit+1 DV: Yield Spreadit+1 DV: Credit Ratingit+1 DV: Yield Spreadit+1
Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
RD Intensityit -45.667** -145.816*** -2736.344* -9731.792*** -4.219 -30.666 -38.499 -1297.300
(14.891) (38.394) (1170.840) (2610.851) (6.116) (52.657) (280.152) (2740.791)
Sq.RD Intensityit 1928.448*** 134702.840*** 355.614 16925.885
(552.492) (40868.728) (630.853) (34364.961)
Debt Maturityit 0.017* 0.016* 0.628 0.559 -0.000 0.001 -0.036 0.024
(0.008) (0.008) (0.452) (0.434) (0.009) (0.008) (0.407) (0.303)
SG&Ait -0.989 0.509 40.069 144.670+ 2.973 3.352 -68.736 -50.686
(1.235) (0.987) (86.658) (85.417) (2.660) (3.022) (46.284) (47.565)
ROAit -14.956 -13.403 -1127.603 -1019.133 -1.528 -3.296 330.992 246.831
(9.120) (8.320) (689.565) (699.333) (10.465) (11.287) (339.750) (365.182)
M/B Ratioit -0.001 0.002 0.442 0.657 -0.109 -0.110 -2.547 -2.632
(0.029) (0.022) (1.136) (0.803) (0.079) (0.082) (1.925) (1.977)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jbar.v2i4.1099
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trenchment. We adopt the E-Index developed by Bebchuk, 
Cohen, and Ferrell (2009) as our measure of managerial 
entrenchment. The E-index is a commonly used measure 
for managerial entrenchment in corporate governance 
literature, as it combines direct restrictions on share-
holder power (staggered boards, limits to shareholder 
amendments of the bylaws, supermajority requirements 
for mergers, and supermajority requirements for charter 
amendments) and antitakeover provisions (poison pills 
and golden parachute), all of which contribute to manage-
rial entrenchment. Higher score indicates stronger mana-
gerial entrenchment. As the E-Index is only available in 
year 1990, 1993, 1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, and 2006, 
we have to assume level of managerial entrenchment fixed 
until the score updates. For example, the level of manage-
rial entrenchment of firm A is assumed to be the same in 
2002 and 2003. 
A firm is identified as strongly (weakly) entrenched if 
it’s E-index score if above (below) the industry average in 
year-quarter t. A firm’s industry is identified by the 4-dig-
it SIC code reported in Compustat. The results in Table 
3 support hypothesis 2. R&D intensity has strong and 
varying effects on creditor value in different situations of 
existing R&D investment only when managerial entrench-
ment is absent or weak. But strong managerial entrench-
ment offsets such effects, and R&D intensity is no longer 
a determinant of creditor value.
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(2.325) (2.036) (89.833) (98.619) (3.745) (4.574) (93.793) (142.778)
F-Statistics 148.10*** 153.48*** 32.46*** 34.38*** 110.65*** 105.59*** 12.47*** 11.91***
Adj. R-Squared 0.9540 0.9562 0.8159 0.8270 0.9771 0.9768 0.8172 0.8145
Observations 441 441 441 441 78 78 78 78
Note: + if p < 0.10; * if p < 0.05; ** if p < 0.01; *** if p < 0.001; p-value are calculated for two-tailed test; Clustered standard errors in parentheses; 
industry and year-quarter dummies are included but are not reported to preserve space.
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